Missouri University of Science and Technology

Scholars' Mine
Electrical and Computer Engineering Faculty
Research & Creative Works

Electrical and Computer Engineering

01 Jan 1997

Safety Analysis of Redundant Systems Using Fuzzy Probability
Theory
James P. Dunyak
Ihab W. Ssad
Donald C. Wunsch
Missouri University of Science and Technology, dwunsch@mst.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsmine.mst.edu/ele_comeng_facwork
Part of the Electrical and Computer Engineering Commons

Recommended Citation
J. P. Dunyak et al., "Safety Analysis of Redundant Systems Using Fuzzy Probability Theory," Proceedings of
the High Consequences Operations Safety Symposium II, pp. 299-308, Sandia National Laboratories, Jan
1997.

This Article - Conference proceedings is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars' Mine. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Electrical and Computer Engineering Faculty Research & Creative Works by an authorized
administrator of Scholars' Mine. This work is protected by U. S. Copyright Law. Unauthorized use including
reproduction for redistribution requires the permission of the copyright holder. For more information, please
contact scholarsmine@mst.edu.

Safety Analysis of Redundant Systems Using

Fuzzy Probability Theory
James Dunyak
lhab W. Saad
Donald Wunsch
Texas Tech University
Lubbock,Texas

Abstract
This paper develops a new theory of independent fuzzy probabilities, that addresses
limitations of fuzzy fault trees both and Zadeh's fuzzy extension of probability. In
contrast to the fuzzy fault tree approach, the new theory is complete since it assigns a
fuzzy probability to every event. In the case of a probability theory built from
independent events·, Zadeh' s extension is not consistent with fuzzy fault trees. Our new
extension is also consistent. The new theory is demonstrated with an example.

Introduction
Many safety assessment models require, as input, the probabilities of a number of
independent events. Often these probabilities can be estimated from data or theory, but
sometimes choosing probabilities for input is difficult. This work is part of an ongoing
study in high-consequence surety analysis. Many of the factors of interest come from

traditionally non-mathematical areas of research, such as estimating the probability of a
terrorist attack, compliance with safety practices, or a flawed design of a safety system.
Other factors are too expensive or dangerous to measure experimentally. Instead, expert
opinion is used to provide these probabilities, but these estimates are rarely precise.
Fuzzy sets and possibility theory provide a tool for describing and analyzing these
uncertain quantities.
Fuzzy fault trees provide a powerful and computationally efficient technique for
developing fuzzy probabilities based on independent inputs. The probability of any event
that can be described in terms of a sequence of independent unions, intersections, and
complements may be calculated by a fuzzy fault tree. Unfortunately, fuzzy fault trees do
not provide a complete theory: Events of substantial practical interest for calculating
safety margins cannot be described only by independent operations. Thus the standard
fuzzy extension (based on fuzzy fault trees) is not complete, since not all events are
assigned a fuzzy probability. Zadeh and others have proposed other complete extensions.
Unfortunately, the calculations of these models are not consistent with the underlying
fuzzy probabilities of the independent inputs.
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In this paper, we discuss a new extension of crisp probability theory. Our model is based
on n independent inputs, each with a fuzzy probability. The elements of our sample

space describe exactly which of the n input events did and did not occur. Our extension
is complete, since a fuzzy probability is assigned to every subset of the sample space.
Our extension is also consistent with all calculations that can be arranged as a fault
tree [l].
Our approach allows the reliability analyst to develop complete and consistent fuzzy
reliability models from existing crisp models. This allows a comprehensive analysis of
the system. Computational algorithms are provided both to extend existing models and
develop new models. The technique is demonstrated with an example.

An uncertain parameter F e iR may be assigned a fuzzy membership function E(y)
mapping iR into [0,1], which is the membership function of a fuzzy set ;E. Then the
possibility that Eis in a set S is designated by IIF(S), and

This is the sense in which we describe uncertainty in the probability of an event A. Note
the inherent conservative nature of possibility theory: the possibility of a set is high if a
single point in the set has high possibility. This may be viewed as a worst-case
calculation and is appropriate for the study of rare but high- consequence events. An
uncertainty model based on probability theory, on the other hand, better models the

average risk over repeated trials.
In this paper, ~ is a fuzzy set describing uncertainty in the crisp number P(A). Fuzzy
fault trees provide a method for developing fuzzy probabilities based on independent
fuzzy inputs~ [2]. The probability of any event that can be described in terms of a
sequence of independent unions, intersections, and complements may be calculated by a
fuzzy fault tree. Unfortunately, we show below that some events of substantial practical
interest cannot be described only by independent operations; fuzzy fault trees do not
provide a complete theory. Thus the standard fuzzy extension (based on fuzzy fault
trees) is not complete, since not all events are assigned a fuzzy probability. Zadeh
proposed another extension that is complete [3], but his extension is shown (in our
context) to be inconsistent with the calculations from fuzzy fault trees.
Here we develop a new extension of crisp probability theory, based on n independent
inputs, each with a fuzzy probability. The elements of our sample space describe exactly
which of the n input events did and did not occur. This extension will be shown to be
both complete and consistent. These results are discussed in more detail in [l].

Independent Calculations and Fuzzy Fault Trees
Throughout this paper, we use the bar notation EA to indicate a fuzzy set representing
probability of A, the notation ~(y) to indicate the corresponding membership function,
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and £./={y:L(y):?:a.} to indicate the corresponding a.-cuts. A convex fuzzy set~ has
special structure; each a.-cut is a closed and convex subset of 9i. We see for a convex
fuzzy probability that each a.-cut can be written as a closed interval with~ex = LPAI ex,

PA2a].

This assumption of convexity is equivalent to assuming that the membership
function has a single mode. Earlier work with independent fuzzy probabilities relied on
this (often quite reasonable) assumption of convexity, but our work will be more general.
Following the lead of most fuzzy models, all fuzzy sets here are required to have
nonempty a.=l cut. This property is called normality.
Consider independent events A 1,A2, ... , An with estimated fuzzy probabilities ~ 1~ 2, ... ,
~n, which will be used in a reliability model. Our goal is to build a fuzzy probability
theory to describe the probabilities of various unions, intersections, and complements of
these sets. To this end, we follow the standard approach of Tanaka et. al. [2] and first
build fuzzy intersections of independent events.
If events Ai are independent, then for crisp probabilities we have

and

Using the usual extension principle, we define the fuzzy independent union and
intersection as
fNvAj(Y)=

SUPy=pi+pj-pi pj

min[ fN(pD,~j(pj)]

(Eq. 1)

and
(Eq. 2)
Complements of fuzzy probabilities are similarly defined by
fN(y)=

SUPy=I-pi

fN(pD = fN(l-y).

(Eq. 3)

We then have the following familiar properties:
~ivAj =LjvAi
f(AivAj)vAk =.RAfv(AjvAk)

~inAj =LjnAi
f(AinAj)nAk =hin(AjnAk)
tAinAj)' =Lj'vAi' ·

(Eq. 4)

This third formula is DeMorgan's law and extends in the obvious way to
f(AlvA2v ...vAk)' =h1•nA2'n...nAk'
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f(AlnA2n ...nAk)' =L1•vA2'v...uAk' (Eq. 5)
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If the fuzzy probabilities are convex, we have the relationships between endpoints of the
a-cut intervals
[PAivAj la, PAivAj 2 a]=

(Eq. 6)
and
[PAinAj la, P AinAj 2 a]=[ P Ai l a P Aj l a, P Ai 2 a P Aj 2 a]·

(Eq. 7)

Unfortunately, the distributive laws fail. Straightforward application of the above
formulas shows
rruv(AjnAk)

*p

(AivAj)n(AivAk)

.EAin(AjvAk)

*

P(AinAj)u(AinAk) •

(Eq. 8)

This formula fails because of the violation of independence.
As we see in Equation 8, care must be used in organizing calculations to maintain
independence. This is usually done by describing calculations as a tree structure. This
viewpoint was naturally assumed in several papers on fuzzy fault trees [2,4,5,6,7,8]. To
illustrate this concept, consider the example tree diagram in Figure 1. This diagram
contains three varieties of nodes: unions, intersections, and complements. At the nodes,
fuzzy input probabilities are combined according to the formulas in equations (1-3). As

long as the tree only feeds upward and each node has only one output, independence is
maintained. Because of DeMorgan's laws in Equation 5, we can develop fault trees using
only unions and intersections (but no complements) or only intersections and
complements (but no unions). Thus several somewhat different approaches to fault trees
are in fact equivalent when the standard extensions in Equations 1 through 3 are used.
0

and

not

A3
Figure 1. A fuzzy fault tree which maintains independence.
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Unfortunately, many problems do not easily fit into a straightforward tree structure, with
each node having only one output. In our investigations, certain factors (such as
terrorism risk) influence many different events, so that construction of independent trees
is problematic. As we will see in the next section, other problems also occur.

Completeness
The representation of some sets can be rearranged to allow use of Equations 1 through 3 .
.For example, in Equation 8, since AiuAj is not (necessarily) independent of AiuAk> we
could simply define
f(AivAj)()(AivAk) =.fA.iv(Aj()A)c) ·

(Eq. 9)

Now Aj and Ak are independent so we can correctly calculate £Aj()A)c using equation 2.
Since Ai is independent of A/1Ak, we can apply Equation 1 to calculate £Aiv(Aj()Ak)·
Unfortunately, unraveling such relationships can be very difficult in complex models. Of
greater concern is the fact that not all possible fuzzy probabilities can be calculated by
rearranging them into a calculation that maintains independence.
For example, a listing of all possible independent calculations easily shows that
(A{ nAj)u(AinA/) may not be rearranged to allow calculation by independence
formulas. Consider two independent system components numbered i and j. If event Ai
indicates that i is operational and Aj indicates that j is operational, then fcAi'r,Aj)v(Air,Aj') is
the fuzzy probability that exactly one of the two components is operational. The inability
of Equations 1 through 3 to calculate such probabilities is a serious limitation in
reliability applications.
This limitation is illustrated by the example we use in this paper. Consider the threestage manufacturing process shown in Figure 2. This diagram shows the flow of an
industrial process through three stages. Stage 1 may be performed by two redundant
units, each with a throughput capacity of 0.5 items per second. If both units 1 and 2 are
operational, stage 1 has a throughput capacity of 1 item per second. If only one of the
two units is operational, the stage 1 throughput is 0.5 items per second. If neither unit 1
nor unit 2 is operational, the throughput capacity of stage 1 is 0. This viewpoint may be
used to build the throughput capacity of the entire process, with the capacity of stage 1
limiting the possible flow through stage 2, and so on. Let Ai be the event that unit i is
operational. Assume the process has repairable (or replaceable) independent units, and
that the process has been in operation long enough to approximately reach stationarity.
Then Pi=P(Ai) is the stationary readiness coefficient of unit.i [9]. Letting T be the
process throughput capacity, we can calculate the steady state distribution of T as

(Eq. 10)
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and so on. Possible values of T are {0, 0.4, 0.5, 0.8, 1.0}. Calculation of the distribution
of T follows easily when the stationary readiness coefficients are crisp; our goal is to
study this process with fuzzy readiness coefficients. To calculate the fuzzy probability
fT=o.s, we must calculate the fuzzy probability that exactly one of units 1 and 2 is
functional. Unfortunately, as discussed in the proceeding paragraph, this fuzzy

probability cannot be modeled using Equations 1 through 3. Several other "gaps'' occur
in the fuzzy reliability model of the system.
Unit3
capacity=0.4
rJ

-

Unit 1
capacity=0.5

-

---J

Unit2
- capacity=0.5

stage 1

-

Unit4
; capacity=0.4

~

Lnit 6
capacity=l

~

Unit5
capacity=0.4
.....
-

stage 2

stage 3

Figure 2. A three-stage industrial process.

Clearly, many important fuzzy probabilities cannot be reached by the standard
independence formulas in equations 1-3. To understand what sets are missing, we
should more carefully specify the probability space of interest in our reliability problem.
Definition: The sample space Sn based on n independent events Ai, A2,
2n distinct elements

••. ,Anthe

set of

of the form

For the remainder of this paper, the notation Ai will be used to indicate the independent
events from which Sn is defined.
Note that Sn has a finite number of elements, so our sample space is discrete. A fuzzy
probability theory, in keeping with both our needs and the structure of crisp probability
theory for discrete sample spaces, should assign a probability for every subset of Sn.

Definition: A fuzzy probability theory is called complete if it assigns a fuzzy probability
to every subset of Sn.
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Consider a set subset B of Sn, which can be constructed through independent operations.
For an event B, which can be organized as an independent calculation, we define B as the
fuzzy probability theory resulting from repeated application of Equations 1 through 3.

Zadeh's Linguistic Probabilities and Consistency
Now we must build the definition of fuzzy probability for subsets of Sn from the given
fuzzy probabilities ~ 1 ~ 2, ... , £An. Following Zadeh [3], we can define an extension.
Consider a proper subset B of a sample space Sn={s 1,s2,... ,s2n}, with B={ti, t2, ... , tk}
where ti are the elements in Sn which are in B. We define, using a superscript Z to
indicate Zadeh's extension,
(Eq. 11)

The inequality in the sup is a result of the interactivity of crisp probabilities, since
Li=t,2n P({sJ) =l.
Each £si(.) is calculated from ~ 1 £A2, ... , £An using independence and Equations 1
through 3. This formulation does provide a fuzzy probability for every subset of Sn.
Unfortunately, Equations 11 and 12 are not consistent with the calculations in Equations
1 through 3 [1].

A Complete and Consistent Formulation of

Independent Fuzzy Probabilities
As an alternative to Zadeh's approach, we consider a different extension. Consider a
reliability model built in terms of the independent fuzzy probabilities £Ai, i=l,2, ... , n, for
sample space Sn. Using, for crisp probabilities, the definition Pi=P(Ai), we see, for subset
B of Sn, that
P(B)= P( UsieB {sJ )= LsieB P( {sJ )= fs(P1,P2, .... ,pn)

(Eq. 12)

for a function f8 (.). Thus the crisp probability of every B can be written uniquely as a
function fs(.) in terms of p 1, p2, ... , Pn· For the empty set <I> we have fip(pi,p 2,.... ,pn)=0 and
for the sample space we have fsn(pi,p 2,.... ,pn)=l. We use these functions to build our
extension of Equations 1 through 3. We can now define our extension for B.
Definition: For subset B of Sn, the extension of independent fuzzy probabilities is

High Consequence Operations Safety Symposium II
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with P(B)=fB(p 1,p2,... ,p0 ) when P(Ai)= Pi· If, for a fixed y, the set
{(p1,P2,•··,Pn):y=fB(P1,P2,•••,Pn)} is empty, we take rl(y)=O. The function fB(.) is defined
in Equation 12.
The extension _eaE, when derived from independent fuzzy probabilities £Ai, is both
consistent and complete. See [1] for a complete proof.

An Example
To demonstrate the technique, we consider the three-stage process discussed above and
illustrated in Figure 2. To demonstrate the calculations, the event T=0.8 will be
discussed. To simplify the illustration, all six independent units are assumed to have the
fuzzy readiness coefficient shown in Figure 3. Note that

(a)

(b)

m
.c

c..0.5

0.5

m

0'--~~-«--...,_~~~--'-~~~-"

-2.5

-2

-1.5

-1

-0.06

-0.04

log1 O(p)

-0.02

0

log10(p)

Figure 3. The fuzzy idleness coefficient (a) and readiness coefficient (b) for a single unit.
Figure 4 shows the resulting fuzzy probabilities for T=O, T::0.4, T=0.5, T=0.8, and
T=l.O. These fuzzy probabilities describe the long-term performance of the industrial
process.
(a)

(b)

(c)

m

.c

c..0.5

0.5

m

o~~~~~~~~

-2

306

-1

0

-3

-2

-1
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(d)

(e)

1

1

o..0.5

0.5

ro

.c

ro

0
-3

-2

-1

0

0

log10(p)

-0.2

0

log10(p)

Figure 4. The resulting fuzzy probabilities for the process throughput T=0 (a), T=0.4 (b),
T=0.5 (c), T=0.8 (d), and T=1 (e).
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